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Any theodicy is often fraught with difficulties. The two major families identified are 
Augustinian theodicy and Irenaean theodicy, named after these two early church 
fathers. These two perspectives are widely accepted accounts of theodicy and 
represent a general theological approach to the problem of evil. We will explore the 
insufficiency of these perspectives in light of evolutionary considerations and, in the 
end, disappointingly, call for an as yet developed theodicy to be offered. 
 
God … either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is 
unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If He is 
willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character 
of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with 
God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore 
not God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what 
source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them? 
      Epicurus, as quoted by Lactantius1 
 
The presence of evil and suffering in the 
world has presented theists with an enduring 
problem. Clear tension, if not outright 
contradiction, stands between the existence 
of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and 
the existence of natural evil particularly in 
the case of gratuitous suffering. Moral evil 
we can blame on ourselves, although 
doctrines like original sin are not all that 
helpful.2 Over the past two millennia, many 
Christian thinkers have thought it necessary 
to provide a logical account for evil within 
the Christian faith and have thus taken up 
the task of developing a satisfactory 
theodicy. From many proposed 
formulations, two major families identified 
by theologian John Hick3 have emerged and 
remain influential today: Augustinian 
theodicy and Irenaean theodicy. While both 
of these perspectives are born out of the 
writings of these two early church fathers, 
                                                          
1 The Works of Lactantius. (4th century), p28.  
2 Brannan, 2007. 
3 Hick, 2010. 
both have been carried into contemporary 
thought and received modern treatments and 
formulations. These two perspectives are 
thought to comprise the most organized and 
widely accepted accounts of theodicy within 
the Christian schema; they represent a 
general theological approach to the problem 
of evil in modern times. We will explore the 
insufficiency of these perspectives in light of 
modern science and, in the end, they still 
disappointingly call for an as yet developed 
theodicy to be offered. 
 
In the past century and a half, scientific 
explanation has answered more questions 
and its application has resolved many 
intractable problems. The science behind the 
observation of evolution, the theory of 
natural selection, has come to be accepted as 
a principal concept within this currently held 
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scientific view.4 Through intense scrutiny 
and study, Darwin’s model of evolution by 
natural selection has emerged as an 
incredibly helpful insight into the living 
world and is now a foundational premise in 
both the natural and social sciences. 
Unfortunately, the development of the 
Darwinian worldview has met significant 
opposition from many Christian 
fundamentalists. The ideas of natural 
selection and modification by descent from a 
common ancestor complicate traditional 
interpretations of scripture. Among the 
many issues that would need to be 
thoroughly reexamined is the Christian 
approach to theodicy. 
 
Therefore, I will examine the challenges that 
evolutionary thought presents for the 
Augustinian and Irenaean perspectives on 
theodicy. Each perspective will be briefly 
represented in its currently relevant form 
and then examined in light of Darwinism. 
The evolutionary perspective takes seriously 
the processes that start with a common 
ancestor and display increasing 
diversification of living organisms across 
successive generations through heritable 
changes in the genome and its expression, 
coupled with natural selection – the 
tendency for changes that prove 
advantageous for survival and sustainable 
reproduction in a given environment will be 
preserved. This definition is well within the 
widely accepted tenets of evolution as 
conceived by Darwin and his successors. I 
will strive to avoid scientific reductionism; 
instead, I shall look through the lens of 
evolution and examine an important element 
of Christian thought in order to observe the 
points of contention which require further 
development in hopes of resolution. 
 
                                                          
4 National Academy of Sciences, Institute of 
Medicine, National Academies. (2008). p11 
5 Augustine Confessions, Book VII, p. 18  
Augustinian Theodicy 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) remains 
one of the more prominent and influential 
early Christian theologians. He is credited 
with laying the groundwork for the first of 
the two considered theodicies. His magnum 
opus, City of God, lays out a sophisticated 
organization of reflections regarding the 
origin and nature of evils and their 
relationship to a Christian Lord and Creator. 
His perspective was carried on and further 
revised by a number of Western theists 
including Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin. 
His formulation is recognizable today in a 
variety of versions, but is perhaps most 
prominent in the free will defense of Alvin 
Plantinga; sadly, his argument stops short 
and merely asserts that the argument is not 
logically incoherent. 
 
Augustine’s theodicy approaches the task of 
reconciling an omniscient, omnipotent, 
benevolent God and the existence of evil by 
primarily looking to the origin and nature of 
humanity. Augustine affirms that everything 
the Creator creates is good; indeed, it is 
perfect.5 However, humanity is created 
possessing volition, the ability to freely 
choose right and wrong thinking and see it 
through to action.6 Augustine posits that 
since all things are created good, and since it 
follows that their nature is good, evil does 
not exist as an entity in and of itself. Evil is, 
rather, the privation of good.7 Augustine 
holds that though all things were created 
good, including humanity, the free choice of 
Adam to disobey the will of God introduced 
a misuse of the created good, enacting a 
necessary potential in human freedom: 
namely, the freedom to depart from the good 
will of a benevolent Creator. Put another 
way, the onus for evil in the world does not 
lie with God, but with humanity. This 
6 Free Will, Book III. 
7 Enchiridion of Augustine, p.11 
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fundamental theological position has come 
to be known among Christians as The Fall. 
Augustine therefore makes allowance for the 
evils that we witness as just punishment for 
the actions taken through Adam and which 
affect us all. Augustine holds that through 
the grace of God and confession of Jesus 
Christ as the perfect incarnation and 
sacrifice, the sin might be accounted for and 
the confessor, upon death, can resume his 
position as one who does not sin. 
 
This brief reflection brings to light several 
key elements in Augustine’s theodicy. First, 
it is clearly of tantamount importance to 
Augustine that a perfect God cannot be held 
responsible for evil; through the sin of 
Adam, humanity bears full responsibility. 
Secondly, it is clear that free will is a 
necessary condition of Adam, otherwise his 
transgression could not be considered sin, 
and God would again be culpable.8 Thirdly, 
if the original sin is what ushered in evil and 
death, then there is a period prior to this 
event in which there was no evil and 
presumably no suffering or death. 
 
Examined from the perspective of 
evolutionary thought, Augustinian theodicy 
seems to suffer on its own premises. When 
the Augustinian theologian begins with a 
critique of the advent of evil through an 
action of humans, she must account for why 
there appears in the natural world such 
suffering, pain, death and struggle even 
before humankind comes into existence … 
some of which, at least in human eyes, 
seems gratuitous and unnecessary. As 
Arvind Sharma points out, distinct, 
recognizable vectors such as disease and 
natural disaster long preceded human 
existence.9 In truth, apart from discrete 
causes of suffering, pain, and what has been 
referred to as the natural evils, a brief 
                                                          
8 True Religion, Chap XIV 
analysis of the process of natural selection 
elucidates a deeper incompatibility in these 
two views. If natural selection is indeed 
viewed as the mechanism by which genes 
are generationally transmitted (driven by the 
selective pressures within nature including 
competition for limited resources and mates, 
ability to avoid predation, and suitability to 
endure harsh conditions), then these natural 
evils have served as selective conditions 
presumably from the origin of life. Unless 
the action of Adam is thought to have some 
kind of retroactive effect upon the creation, 
it is not readily apparent how the free action 
of a man can be upheld as the cause of 
natural evils such as death and suffering, 
and extinction, in animals. 
 
In addition to this difficulty, the Augustinian 
theodicy also assumes that a rational and 
volitional decision was made to rebel against 
the will of God through Adam. If the notion 
of evolutionary descent of all life from a 
common ancestor is upheld, and humans 
developed by degrees through the 
mammalian line to the hominids we 
currently are, then it becomes difficult to pin 
down when exactly such a monumental 
decision might have taken place. At what 
point in our development could humanity be 
held as a free moral agent in the mind of a 
Creator? Alternatively, if ‘original sin’ does 
not take the form of a single incident of a 
single man, but rather the collective trend of 
actions of a developing species, what set or 
trend would be considered? Could original 
sin be no more than any selfish action that 
prohibits fecundity in any other species? 
Evil is what interrupts new creation. Perhaps 
eating of the forbidden fruit was the 
metaphorical idea of destroying the very life 
processes that God had ordained as sacred. 
We have been given so much fruitfulness 
already, why do we also have to greedily 
9 A Primal Perspective on the Philosophy of Religion, 
p85 
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take that from which we are asked to refrain. 
At what point in the evolutionary history of 
hominids can we settle on for the event(s) 
that determined when and how humanity 
departed from the will of God? 
  
When these considerations are combined, it 
becomes clear that the Augustinian line of 
theodicy is faced with problems in 
defending the premise that humanity is 
clearly to blame for the presence of natural 
evil in the world, a central premise to the 
integrity of Augustine’s argument.10 
 
Irenaean Theodicy 
Irenaeus, the 2nd century bishop of 
Lugdunum, and Origen of Alexandria are 
credited with the foundational principle of 
the second of school of theodicy considered; 
it bears the name of the former church 
father. While Augustine’s theodicy was 
favored in the Roman Catholic Church and 
most of western Protestantism with 
medieval and renaissance theists being 
strongly affected by it, Irenaean thinking 
proved more influential in the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition but made a resurgence in 
popularity with German theists Gottfried 
Leibniz (1646-1716) and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Leibniz 
borrowed from Irenaean thought to develop 
an optimism theodicy (as in optimal world). 
Schleiermacher and the more notable 
contemporary proponent, John Hick (1922-
2012), organized the previous writings into 
the Augustinian and Irenaean families; Hick 
went on to formulate his own sophisticated, 
                                                          
10 This critique is in addition to the devastating one 
against Augustine’s illogic in his argument where 
Brannan (2007), referencing F. LeRon Shults (2003), 
asks, “If they [Adam and Eve] were perfectly wise, 
why were they misled? If they were created foolish 
(and since folly is the greatest of the vices), why is 
God the author of vice? We can counter that it was 
Satan who tempted them (as did Augustine), but this 
still does not get our conception of God off the hook. 
Irenaean-influenced theodicy by 
incorporating Darwinian thought. 
 
The Irenaean approach to theodicy differs 
from the Augustinian on several important 
points. While Augustinian thinkers attempt 
to argue that God is not responsible for the 
creation and existence of evil, the Irenaean 
line claims that God is indeed responsible 
and justified for the allowance of the 
existence of evil. Irenaean theodicy uses 
different approaches to argue that an 
omnipotent, benevolent Creator would 
create an ideal (not perfect without death 
and suffering) world to serve the purposes of 
the Creator. Thus, it follows that if evil 
exists, it exists to serve a purpose or 
multiple purposes in the ultimate designs of 
God, traditionally referred to as the “best of 
all possible worlds” argument (optimism). 
Essential to this line of thinking is the 
assertion that the creation of man in the 
image and likeness of God was not an 
instantaneous action in a time gone by, but a 
continuing process that progresses 
throughout the life and experiences of the 
individual and species as a whole. The 
Irenaean approach holds that mankind is not 
the once perfect, now broken product of a 
discrete creation action, but rather the 
continuing creation and, in the mind of some 
Irenaean scholars, co-contributor in the 
ultimate product. This retains the importance 
of free will for each individual and also 
attempts to make room for evil as a 
necessary condition for the continued 
creation of humanity into God’s likeness. 
Origin refers to the concept as something 
It just pushes the objection back a step or postulates 
that God pre‐destined Satan’s sinful act and Adam’s 
disobedience; or we become victim to Manichean 
thought. Augustine, like so many others, begs the 
question with the claim that it is an incomprehensible 
mystery.” (p. 191). Even Augustine admits his illogic 
with the claim of “incomprehensible mystery.” 
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akin to a school of the soul, while John 
Hicks prefers the term “soul-making 
theodicy”11. This continued creation of the 
soul then leads up to and is fully realized in 
the parousia of scripture and reunion with 
God. Irenaean theodicy holds that if these 
two considerations (purpose of evil and 
continuing creation) are correct, then there is 
no logical or evidential problem with the 
simultaneous existence of evil and an all 
powerful, all loving God. 
 
Naturally, this position is not without 
criticism. Fyodor Dostoyevski portrays a 
withering critique of this position in his 
famous dialogue “Rebellion,” portraying it 
as a heartless and unthinkable calculation for 
a loving God.12  A number of theologians 
and philosophers have been quick to point 
out that the Irenaean theodicy appears to 
feature a paradoxical God who, although 
omnibenevolent, is imposing natural pain 
and suffering (including, what seem to 
some, gratuitous ‘evils’) to achieve his own 
ends. Nevertheless, this theodicy has had 
considerable success in the modern era 
creating a logical account for evil. As one 
might suspect from a post-Darwinian writer, 
John Hicks makes an admirable effort in 
accounting for the scientific account of 
evolution in his writings. As a fruit of these 
efforts, Irenaean theodicy seems to suffer 
less criticism from a Darwinian perspective. 
However, there are still points of tension. 
Eleanor Stump points out that if the entire 
place for evil is in the continuing formation 
of the soul of individuals, it does not appear 
to account for the suffering of those with 
debilitating disabilities, terminal illnesses 
and other conditions that are very difficult to 
                                                          
11 Evil and the God of Love, p289 
12 The Brothers Karamazov, p267 
13 “The Problem of Evil.” Faith and Philosophy 2: 
392-423 
14 The Groaning of Creation, p10 
perceive as formative.13 This argument can 
be expanded to a multitude of easily 
imaginable cases: an infant who has died of 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), an 
individual born with a genetic disability that 
severely limits her physical and mental 
capacity, or any number of other 
unnecessary maladies. While it may appear 
possible to account for pain, suffering, and 
evil in the larger, theoretical picture, the 
theodicy appears to have much less 
explanatory power against specific 
instances; this specificity is partially of why 
Dostoyevsky’s critique has such enduring 
strength.  
 
Also, as Christopher Southgate notices, the 
Irenaean theodicy fails to account for the 
suffering of animals and, thus, what is called 
natural evil.14 While this problem is neatly 
avoided in the Augustinian position by 
attributing natural evils such as animal 
suffering (along with humanity’s) to the sin 
of mankind due to the fall, Irenaean 
approaches see gratuitous animal suffering 
and our own as an opportunity for 
developing the soul in the best of possible 
worlds where freedom is valued regardless 
of agony. Following this logic, if animals 
cannot be thought to have a soul comparable 
to that of humans,15 then it is not readily 
apparent for what purpose they suffer, 
unless it can be totally accounted for by 
some soul-making utility for humanity such 
as the cultivation of sympathy or 
compassion. If this latter position is the case, 
the Irenaean view is problematic from a 
Darwinian perspective – it fails to account 
for the suffering of all life past and present 
over billions of years when no humans had 
15 This claim, in fact, is likely incorrect as nephesh 
(or nepes) in Hebrew is used for both humans and 
animals. One is likely to make more progress by 
considering the difference between God’s image 
versus His likeness, as Irenaeus does, but the 
discussion is more involved than can be had here. 
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even yet appeared. The rigors of natural 
selection and gratuitous extinctions seem to 
magnify suffering and death beyond what is 
needed for humanity to arrive and survive. 
 
Southgate seeks denouement of this 
conundrum by embedding Irenaean thought 
into an evolutionary perspective by 
affirming the teleological worth of the 
animal life, but his argument suffers a 
similar flaw as does the larger Irenaean 
framework in addressing particular 
instances. For example, what possible “soul-
making” telos does a non-living parasitic 
virus possess? Irenaean theodicy appears to 
be lacking explanatory power in light of the 
Darwinian processes of modification by 
descent from a common ancestor. 
 
Conclusion 
If a system of thought is to be accepted, it 
must not only address the problems that are 
readily apparent at the time of conception 
but also the issues that arise when newly 
accepted information is applied. If there is a 
contradiction, the necessary logical task of 
those who accept the ideas must be to 
reexamine the position and either revise or 
reject it. This is the position of the theist 
who accepts evolution today. The purpose of 
this brief essay is merely to accomplish the 
recognition that our existing approaches to 
account for gratuitous natural evil and 
suffering do not appear sufficient in light of 
the evidence supplied by the theory of 
evolution.16 The harsh glare of Darwinian 
thought reveals a need for new renderings of 
theodicy. 
 
Perhaps if we explore process or open 
theology where God empties Himself 
(Herself?) of power to enable sentience to 
evolve without interference – co-creators 
with the image and likeness of God who are 
expected to solve the problems of evil – 
perhaps then we may develop more fruitful 
hypotheses. I leave that for others to 
develop.
 
Literature Cited 
Augustine. Confessions, Book VII http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110107.htm 
Augustine. Free Will, Book III http://compsposting.blogspot.com/2012/07/q59-in-book-iii-of-on-
free-choice-of.html 
Augustine. Enchiridion of Augustine. 
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/augustine_enchiridion_02_trans.htm 
Brannan, DK., 2007. Darwinism and Original Sin: Frederick R. Tennant’s Integration of 
Darwinian Worldviews into Christian Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Journal for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science 1:187-217. 
Hick, J. (2010). Evil and the God of Love. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
The Works of Lactantius. (4th century). A Treatise on the Anger of God Addressed to Donatus. 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.i.html 
National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, National Academies. (2008). Science 
Evolution and Creationism. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
Shults, L. (2003). Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to 
Relationality. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans. 
                                                          
16 Our concern was in making sense of natural evil, 
disasters and diseases that seem not to have any 
features or functions other than causing gratuitous 
suffering in even non-human creatures.  
